Why does the government classify certain information

The U. The lowest level, confidential, designates information that if released could damage U. The other designations refer to information the disclosure of which could cause "serious" secret or "exceptionally grave" top secret damage to national security.

At the top secret level, some information is " compartmented. Sometimes this information is given a " code word " so that only those cleared for that particular code word can access the information. This is often used for the most highly sensitive information. There are several other designators that also indicate restricted access. For example, only those holding a secret or top secret clearance, and the critical nuclear weapon design information designation, are allowed to access information related to many aspects of the operation and design of nuclear weapons.

It is common for written documents to contain information that is classified at different levels , including unclassified information. Individual paragraphs are marked to indicate the level of classification. For example, a document's title might be preceded with the marker U indicating the title and existence of the document is unclassified.

Within a document, paragraphs might carry the markers "S" for secret, "C" for confidential or "TS" for top secret. The highest classification of any portion of the document determines its overall classification. This approach allows for the easy identification and removal of classified portions of a document so that less sensitive sections can be shared in unclassified settings.

Below the confidential level, there are varying terms for information that is not classified but still sensitive. Government agencies use different terms for this category of information. The State Department uses the phrase "sensitive but unclassified," while the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security use "for official use only. Executive Order spells out who specifically may classify information.

But the call took place behind a wall of government secrecy. The notes and transcripts from it, as is common practice with calls between the president and foreign leaders, were classified. Revealing the scandal required the whistle-blower—reportedly a member of the CIA who was detailed to the White House—to go through a bureaucratic process that was vulnerable to interference by the executive branch.

Read: The problem with the whistle-blower system. This series of events might suggest that the system worked: In the end, the details of the call became public. But it also underlines the risk of the same predisposition toward secrecy that leads to overclassification.

The problem of overclassification—and of a fetishization of secrecy more generally— spans administrations. A handful of former intelligence and national-security officials disagreed with the idea that overclassification is all that relevant to the scandal surrounding Trump and Ukraine, saying that the practice normally has more innocuous motives than shielding scandals.

This happens because of bureaucratic convenience, rather than maliciousness. As one example, this person noted that emails between U. The code-word server is inconvenient to use and requires logging in to special computers. Until you get to this level. Many are are rather mundane. A former colleague of mine who was a retired CIA analyst used to tell his students he would never knowingly, but almost certainly would inadvertently, share a tidbit of classified information in the classroom.

Dealing with large amounts of classified information over a career increases the possibility of accidentally sharing a small nugget. Sharing classified information knowingly, or revealing information one should know is sensitive, is a different matter.

The U. The lowest level, confidential, designates information that if released could damage U. This is often used for the most highly sensitive information. There are several other designators that also indicate restricted access. For example, only those holding a secret or top secret clearance, and the critical nuclear weapon design information designation, are allowed to access information related to many aspects of the operation and design of nuclear weapons.

It is common for written documents to contain information that is classified at different levels, including unclassified information. Individual paragraphs are marked to indicate the level of classification. The highest classification of any portion of the document determines its overall classification. This approach allows for the easy identification and removal of classified portions of a document so that less sensitive sections can be shared in unclassified settings.

Below the confidential level, there are varying terms for information that is not classified but still sensitive.