What was key to the power of kenan and coughlin

Now with a special urgency in the aftermath of the guilty verdict of Derek Chauvin, the Legislative Black. Caucus wants Speaker Craig Coughlin D to post A, which would establish a municipal civilian review board of local police departments — with subpoena power. The right time for a CCRB is always right now. Shearn :. Only legislative action could grant those powers, the court asserted. The city appealed the decision, while allies in the legislature moved the enabling legislation out of committee.

Coughlin, of course, has the Fraternal Order of Police — the organization that initially filed the lawsuit — in his other ear, opposing the legislation. Tonight, on a call he hosted with Black leaders, Plainfield Mayor Adrian Mapp seized on the moment —. That included an yard run-back for a touchdown against Louisville that ranks as the seventh-longest in school history. Simmons finished his collegiate career with 36 tackles for losses and 11 quarterback sacks.

His jersey number 41 is among those displayed in honor at Kenan Stadium. Simmons has worked as a color analyst for the Tar Heel Sports Network football broadcasts the past two seasons. A two-time All-ACC first-team performer, he led the nation in tackles with an average of Fisher starred on Wolfpack teams that played in three bowl games.

Fisher went on to a play professionally with the Arizona Cardinals and New Orleans Saints before a knee injury in cut short his career.

He moved on from there to build a successful second career as a motivational speaker. A shoulder injury sidelined him for the season and he was redshirted. He switched to offensive tackle in the spring of , a decision that would lead Covert to the College Football Hall of Fame.

As Larry has also just told us, if turnout among parts of the population had been one or two percentage points higher in just a few states, the outcome would have looked different.

Setting aside overall turnout and focusing instead on vote shares among the candidates, the short version of the story is that in almost all population groups, the Democratic candidate, which is to say Clinton, won a slightly smaller share than did Obama in Consider that Trump had an enormous advantage over Clinton among whites with no college degree. Clinton received a much higher share of the black, Latino, and Asian American votes, but for all three groups, it was a slightly smaller share than Obama received in This is a major pattern in the data.

Finally, looking at the overall vote; as one of my students pointed out, in the end this is a partisan story. So we may see a lot more controversy in Congress than one would expect, given that the same party will control the executive and a majority in both houses. Nonetheless, on balance: Republicans voted for Trump, and Democrats voted for Clinton. Independents did vote more for Trump than they did for Clinton, which was not the case in So we have a big partisan story, along with a complicated demographic story.

Moving more deeply into the election results than voting percentages alone permit, I want briefly to talk through a series of potential explanations for the growth of U. The median wealth holder followed a similar script, with a slight rise of wealth up through the early s, and considerable decline since The 75th percentile lost wealth in the Great Recession, but still ended up marginally better off in than in The 90th percentile also lost a little in , but this did not offset their massive gains in wealth since Most dramatically, the 95th percentile has increased their share of wealth by about 90 percent since , despite the — crash.

So the median wealth-holders and the least wealthy Americans have lost the most since , and especially since , while the best-off have gained. You could tell the same story about income, but wealth, in the long run, is a more important measure. That is frightening and infuriating. Nonetheless, one-third of those who favor offering legal status to the undocumented still voted for Trump.

Of the 30 percent of the population who endorse deportation, of course, a majority voted for Trump. Other data show the same pattern: relatively high support for Trump even among those who reject his expressed views on Muslims, Mexicans, or President Obama, along with very strong support among those who share those views. Thus right-wing populism has not only a strong class story, but also a race, ethnicity, and immigration component.

Another possibility: is populism about distrust of government? That means that three in ten voters were on the positive end of this spectrum—not a lot. Of this group, 20 percent voted for Trump. We also have to look at context.

One version of the story is that virtually every city voted for Clinton, and every noncity voted for Trump. This is a very old trope, the urban-rural, urban-suburban, big town—small town division. But other contexts are equally important. What we see in the data is that the higher the death rate among middle-aged whites in a county, the greater the share of votes that Trump got, compared with other Republicans.

Increasingly, the high and perhaps rising death rate for adult whites is a consequence of alcohol use, obesity, opioids, suicide, and a variety of diseases that correlate with people living pretty terrible lives; people living in such communities are disproportionately Trump supporters. The New York Times offered more context for the primaries by examining census data for characteristics of people residing in counties that supported Trump on Super Tuesday.

Labor force participation rates went the opposite way: the higher the share of the population in that county who participate in the labor force, the less support Trump received. With this sort of evidence, we can start to form a picture of counties with a high proportion of Trump supporters: the counties are rural or at least not urban, economically depressed, and disproportionately comprised of residents who seem psychologically and interpersonally depressed as well.

Still, roughly speaking, we would identify the Populist movement of the American Midwest as a phenomenon of the left, much of which got incorporated into Progressive era and New Deal laws and policies. Huey Long was a kind of left populist; perhaps you could call Andrew Jackson a leftist populist, though only with regard to white Americans; there is a radical leftist populism in Greece today.

Here is my final point; we need to think hard about how to characterize the different varieties of populism. One way of understanding right-wing populism is, roughly speaking, that racism, sexism, xenophobia, religious prejudice and prejudice against sexuality and gender identity, although those were less salient in this campaign are embedded in the nature of class antagonisms: they are constitutive of contemporary populism in the United States and elsewhere.

Many Americans agreed with the Supreme Court decision declaring the National Industrial Recovery Administration unconstitutional, on the grounds that it violated separation of powers—the court ruled that in passing the legislation the executive branch was assuming the powers of the legislative branch.

There were a range of Catholic perspectives on these matters, as suggested above. Coughlin and John A. Ryan Coughlin, a dynamic speaker that had built a following around radio broadcast from his Shrine of the Little Flower in Royal Oak, Michigan just outside Detroit was the more well-known of the two and perhaps the most well-known Catholic of his time.